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EU energy – The way 
forward  
The global energy landscape is changing 
very quickly – and not in Europe’s 
favour. Nonetheless, while the EU 
cannot change long-term global trends, 
it can clearly influence them. There can 
be much benefit for citizens and the 
competitiveness of businesses, from 
more European integration and 
investment in the energy sector. 
In support of the Commission’s 
approach and what President Barroso 
has called a ‘no regrets’ scenario (see 
page 4 of this issue), the European 
Council agreed on 22 May on a series of 
guidelines in four fields of energy, 
which together should allow the EU to 
foster its competitiveness and respond 
to the challenge of high prices. It has 
therefore set the scene for tackling 
strategic energy challenges that Europe 
faces and set the tone for working 
together through Europe. 
“This very challenging outlook should 
galvanise the efforts of all of us, both at 
European level and in member states, 
to mobilise every growth lever we have 
at hand and to give any impetus we 
possibly can to help citizens and 
businesses through these very difficult 
times. A stronger European energy 
policy is a particularly important tool to 
achieve this.” With President Barroso’s 
words to the European Council on 
22nd May in mind, this issue of the 
BEPA Monthly Brief examines more 
closely how we can step up our 
European efforts to ensure that our 
energy policy safeguards the security of 
supply for households and companies 
at affordable and competitive prices and 
costs, in a safe and sustainable manner.  
Such an outlook is crucial in making 
steps on what we could indeed call a 
European energy community.  
Philip Lowe, Director General for 
Energy, outlines EU actions that aim to 
ensure that our energy policy meets 
future challenges and leads to Europe’s 
growth and competitiveness. Renowned 
think tanker Laurence Tubiana and 
Thomas Spencer analyse whether 
Europe’s energy policy is on the right 
track, given the complex EU and global 
context .  BEPA adviser  Pierre 
Dechamps builds on the high level 
seminar that BEPA co-organised last 
May with the German Marshall Fund of 
the United States, which examined the 
implications of the global revolution in 
unconventional oil and gas for Europe. 
He assesses the impacts of shale gas on 
the EU’s economic competitiveness, 
particularly vis-à-vis the United States 
and discusses the effect of these choices 
on Europe’s economic recovery. 
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Europe’s competitiveness and energy issues 
are currently at the top of the EU agenda. 
With global energy demand expected to 
increase by one third by 2030 (mainly driven 
by emerging economies such as China and 
India) and relatively high energy prices in the 
EU for both households and business, there is 
a need for a strategic debate on which energy 
policies prepare Europe best for a changing 
and ever more competitive global 
environment. At the same time, the scientific 
consensus on climate change is stronger than 
ever. Energy policies in particular have to 
integrate fully the response to climate trends. 
Rising energy prices and rising volatility levels 
of prices have potential effects on energy-
intensive businesses and their production 
costs, especially in cases where these 
businesses face international competition. In 
2012, industry gas prices were more than four 
times lower in the US than in Europe. It is in 
this context that reflections on the post-2020 
policy framework for energy and climate will 
need to consider how to reconcile 
competitiveness and sustainability concerns. 
 Some of the most energy-intensive industries 
in the EU provide basic input for a broad 
range of other industrial sectors and might 
therefore be considered critical for the EU, 
competing internationally for markets, 
resources and investments. In addition, with 
global CO2 emissions having climbed to a 
record high in 2012, not only the EU’s energy 
and competitiveness agenda, but also the 
climate change agenda is at a crossroads. 
Energy dependence and competitiveness  
But let’s get the picture right: high energy 
prices pose a threat to the EU economy 
mainly because of Europe’s fossil fuel 
dependency which is already substantial today 
(representing 50 percent on average) and is 
expected to rise even more in the medium 
term. With Europe being a price taker, it will 
always be exposed to risks and uncertainties 
which ultimately increase costs. In 
preparation for the EU summit discussions, 
the European Commission calculated that the 
EU currently spends as much as 406 billion 
Euros (that is, 3.2 percent of its GDP) per 
year on oil, gas and coal.  
As the European Commission pointed out in 
its 2012 Competitiveness report, rising energy 
prices will hit primarily "the less energy-
efficient countries and sectors, more 
specialised in energy-intensive products or 
more energy-dependent (e.g. countries more 
heavily dependent on imported fossil fuels)". 
A policy that improves the EU’s cost 
competitiveness will therefore promote 
indigenous resources – with energy efficiency 
being by far the most important resource – 
complemented by policies that deliver the 
promising potential of a fully integrated single 
market for energy. This means that the EU 
will not replicate the US experience where 
shale gas, on its own, is redrawing their 
energy map.  
As was clear from the 22 May Council 
conclusions, the EU has no single game 
changer at hand. Instead, it will have to work 
on several fronts: energy efficiency; the 
internal market; diversification and 
investment. This makes the task of policy 
makers far more complex as a comprehensive 
approach to energy policy is needed. But the 
impetus is strong and the rewards potentially 
great – contributing to economic growth and 
delivering on its ambition of becoming a 
competitive low carbon economy by 2050.  
Energy efficiency  
One of the critical factors that will determine 
the success of this endeavour is the degree to 
which Europe is able to improve its energy 
efficiency. The vast potential that lies in 
energy savings has been recognised by the EU 
in its 2011 energy strategy and more recently 
in the IEA’s World Energy Outlook. The 20 
percent saving target for 2020 alone would 
1 EU energy on the road to 2030  
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deliver savings equal to the current GDP of 
Finland. But the effects of energy efficiency 
are not only the directly saved expenses for 
imports and its dividend in terms of decreased 
exposure to fossil fuel price (volatility). On 
top of that it will allow the EU to move from 
a system of paying energy bills (money and 
jobs leaving the EU) towards boosting 
investments within the EU.  
Completion of the internal energy market  
An open, interconnected, integrated and 
competitive market in which energy can flow 
according to price signals is the second 
component of the EU’s long -term 
competitiveness strategy. It has already helped 
the EU to decouple rising costs in commodity 
prices from wholesale energy prices. What is 
not yet happening is that the benefits in the 
wholesale market are fed through to retail 
prices.  
An on-going study of the EU Commission 
estimates the net economic benefits from 
completion of the internal market to be in the 
range of 16-40 billion euro per year. These are 
add-ons to the benefits we have seen already 
in the past. But for this to happen, we will 
need much more commitment from member 
states to our objective of a single market for 
energy by 2014 starting with the overdue 
phasing out of price regulation where it still 
persists. The same study also demonstrates 
that addressing security of supply within 
national boundaries only results in welfare 
losses. The Commission will shortly be 
producing guidance on the use of national 
capacity mechanisms in order to avoid market 
distortions and exploit opportunities for 
regional cross-border solutions. 
It is the creation of a competitive EU market 
that will also help the EU break the oil-gas 
price link and increase competitive pressure in 
the EU’s gas market. In 2012, one single 
European company, Eon, managed to 
renegotiate the price it pays for gas under 
long-term contracts with Gazprom by as 
much as 1 billion euro. This reduction was 
four times bigger than what one of Germany’s 
biggest energy consuming businesses, 
aluminium producer Trimet, spends per year 
on energy. It is a reduction which arguably 
would not have been achieved in the absence 
of a strong EU stance on energy market rules.  
Renewables are an integral part of the 
European energy market story. Over the past 
years they have become a central player. The 
EU today meets 13 percent of its final energy 
consumption with renewable energy, an 
increase of 5 percentage points in 6 years. 
This is a European success story. But in order 
to continue this success story, renewables 
support schemes now have to become cost-
effective, reflecting the impressive cost 
decreases of the past years for wind turbines 
and PV panels. Otherwise permanent reliance 
on subsidies can only damage Europe’s 
industrial competitiveness and overburden 
constrained national budgets. Nonetheless, 
abrupt and even retroactive changes to 
national support schemes should be avoided 
as they can undermine investor confidence. 
The Commission will soon be presenting, as 
part of a comprehensive package on best 
practice support to renewables and on 
strengthened cooperation mechanisms to 
stimulate trade in renewables across national 
borders.  
Diversification  
In the same way as an investor diversifies his 
portfolio, the European Union will need to 
diversify sources and suppliers in order to 
reduce risk – and ultimately cost. 
Diversification works from two angles: 
imports and indigenous production. For 
imports it is vital to ensure that no country 
relies on a single supplier or supply route. In 
this context, we have to underline the 
important contribution that elaborate 
partnerships with key energy partners can 
make for competitiveness. From the 
production standpoint, Europe’s indigenous 
resources, in particular of conventional and 
unconventional gas, need to be exploited to 
the full, given that gas is a less CO2 polluting 
fuel and has a strong complementarity with 
intermittent renewable supplies. However, we 
must ensure that unconventional gas is 
exploited in ways which are environmentally 
sustainable. The Commission is currently 
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carrying out a comprehensive impact 
assessment on the potential for shale gas in 
Europe.  
Investment 
Major investments and upgrades will be 
necessary to modernise Europe’s ageing 
infrastructure and to allow inter alia for 
renewables to be transmitted, stored and 
backed up. Up to 2020, almost a fifth of the 
EU’s total coal-fired power station capacity is 
due to be retired and will have to be replaced 
even in the absence of a decarbonisation 
agenda. The amounts necessary for new 
generation capacity and smarter grids for 
transmission and distribution (1 trillion euro 
by 2020) cannot be met by public budgets 
alone.  
The private sector’s engagement is vital. It 
will be for EU governments and the 
Commission to enable this by ensuring a 
stable framework for investments. This is 
precisely the intention behind the early launch 
of reflections on the 2030 policy framework, 
the upcoming framework for market 
intervention, the simplified permit granting 
under the revised rules on Transeuropean 
Networks for Energy or the clarification of 
financial investments in unbundled energy 
operators. The energy sector will, however, 
only become an engine of growth if the EU’s 
financial sector succeeds in channelling 
savings to long term investment needs and 
inter alia provide innovative risk sharing 
facilities.  
Ensuring safe, secure and sustainable energy 
supplies at affordable prices, whilst bolstering 
economic recovery and long term 
competitiveness of the EU vis-à-vis its major 
economic counterparts, will require a 
comprehensive EU policy response. This is 
the major challenge on the road to 2030.  
President Barroso’s presentation on “Energy priorities for Europe” to the European Council  
on 22 May 2013. 
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Is Europe’s energy policy on the right track? It is 
not surprising that this question is increasingly 
asked, given the current EU and global context. 
The EU recession and US ‘energy revolution’ 
seem to offer two fundamentally different paths 
for energy, climate and economic policy. 
This article reformulates the question: what other 
paths can Europe follow? It argues that the EU 
must continue with policies focusing on energy 
efficiency, fossil fuel substitutes and strengthening 
the internal market. In the long term, these will be 
crucial to its economic competitiveness and 
resilience. In the short term, there are some 
sectors which could suffer from policy-induced 
increases in energy prices. The Commission 
should look in detail at policies in these specific 
few sectors, rather than proposing a fundamental 
revision of EU energy and climate policy. 
Global trends in energy 
In aggregate terms, the world is currently 
experiencing unprecedented economic growth. 
There are clearly short-term concerns in the major 
growth centres, such as China, Brazil and India. 
Nonetheless, the fundamentals of technological 
catch-up, demography and world trade remain 
reasonably sound.  
Thus, between now and 2030, roughly 3 billion 
people will enter the global middle class – with 
the growth in consumption that this implies. 
Alongside this foreseeable consumption boom, 
resources are, broadly speaking, becoming more 
intensive to extract in terms of capital, energy and 
environmental damages. There are, of course, 
some exceptions to this relatively sombre picture 
of global resource supply, notably the current 
performance of shale gas in the USA. We will 
return to this issue later in the article, in particular 
the potential for this to be repeated in Europe. 
Against this background, in its 2012 report, the 
US National Intelligence Council identified the 
“food, water and energy nexus” as one of its key 
four megatrends that will shape the world in the 
coming two decades. Between 2002 and 2012, the 
World Bank Commodity Price Index for energy 
increased by 100.5 percentage points in real terms; 
for metals and minerals it grew by 83.4 percentage 
points. In the last 3 years, both indices reached 
their highest points in real terms since 1960. 
This trend of growing demand and decreasing 
marginal productivity of resource supply can be 
expected to continue, broadly speaking. In its 
2012 World Energy Outlook, the International 
Energy Agency projects that world primary 
energy demand will increase by 32% between now 
and 2035, under current policies. Recent long-
term projections by BP and Exxon Mobil are 
similar, or indeed more bullish regarding the 
growth of global energy demand. The IEA 
projects oil prices to grow 34% in real terms by 
the same date, under current policies.  
In this global context, it is clear that resource 
efficiency will therefore structure demand in 
global markets and contribute to firm 
competitiveness. The Commission’s 2012 
Competitiveness Review empirically assessed this “[…] 
growing phenomenon of internationalisation and 
cross-border ‘eco-investment’ in clean and more 
energy-efficient technologies and products and 
services, exploiting many business opportunities 
offered by the global environmental and societal 
goals and challenges ahead”.  
Implications of shale gas for the US economy 
Against this long-term structural picture, it is clear 
that a small number of sectors are highly sensitive 
to energy prices in the short term. It is interesting 
to illustrate this by looking at the economic 
impact of shale gas in the United States, which is 
often characterised as a key factor behind a so-
called ‘resurgence’ of US manufacturing and the 
US economy more broadly. For this purpose, we 
have taken data from the US Energy Information 
Agency and US Census Bureau that is organised 
by manufacturing sector and provides highly 
2 EU energy – Preparing the future 
By Laurence Tubiana* and Thomas Spencer** 
* Professor Laurence Tubiana is the founding director of the Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations 
(IDDRI) in Paris.  
** Thomas Spencer is a Research Fellow at IDDRI. 
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detailed information on energy expenditure and 
value added. 
According to this data, two manufacturing 
subsectors sectors are important consumers of gas 
as a feedstock. Cumulatively, they represent less 
than 0.04% of the US economy. A larger group of 
sectors includes important consumers of gas as a 
fuel. Cumulatively, they represent slightly more 
than 1% of the US economy. There is some 
overlap between these two figures. We can also 
look at the upstream side. In 2010, oil and gas 
extraction plus the two sectors for supporting 
services made up 0.33% of total private sector 
employment in the US. Oil and gas extraction 
plus support activities for mining (including all 
mining activities, not just oil and gas) made up 
about 1.6% of US GDP in 2011.  
This analysis does not suggest that the US shale 
gas boom has been insignificant. It has had 
important local and geopolitical impacts on the 
perception of the USA’s dependency on 
hydrocarbon imports. But the USA’s (slow) 
recovery from the 2008/9 crisis cannot be 
attributed to the shale gas boom; nor can the 
revival of US manufacturing. All we can say is that 
at the aggregate level the US energy revolution 
will help a little at the margin, and it will have an 
important impact for a small handful of sectors. 
Alternatives for Europe’s energy policy 
To what extent does Europe have the margin to 
change its energy policy? Between 2012 and 2030, 
Europe’s domestic production of oil and gas are 
projected to decline by 63% and 54% respectively. 
It is reasonably clear that Europe cannot repeat 
the US shale gas revolution. The US took 20 years 
from initial exploration to dramatically ramp up 
production from about 2005. Europe’s population 
density, its different legal regime, its lack of 
exploration and drilling capacity mean that shale 
gas production will proceed slowly, if social 
acceptance can be found.  
The Commission’s own projections, released by 
the Joint Research Center in 2012, show that in 
the most optimistic scenario, shale gas just 
manages to offset the decline in conventional gas 
production. Thus, even in this scenario, Europe’s 
import level is kept roughly stable. European 
shale gas production is projected to be more 
expensive than current European conventional 
production. Given the import levels, the price of 
European gas will continue to depend on 
international markets. The strong regional 
differences in global gas markets will continue, 
with North America standing out as a low-price 
region. 
Europe therefore should continue to focus on 
developing the internal energy market, which can 
help to spread the benefits of more liquid and 
competitive international gas markets, as well as 
allow the roll out of renewables more cost 
effectively. For Europe, there is no real alternative 
to energy efficiency, the internal market and fossil 
fuel substitutes. In the short term, this will mean 
somewhat higher prices, from which a few sectors 
would be at risk. The Commission should look in 
detail at policies in these specific few sectors 
rather than propose a fundamental revision of EU 
energy and climate policy. Existing measures 
already support energy intensive industry: free 
allowances under the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme and exemptions from renewables support 
and energy taxation policies. The Commission 
should closely monitor these policies to ensure 
against distortions of the internal market.  
Europe’s challenge is therefore to navigate in an 
increasingly competitive, fragmented energy 
landscape, which is nonetheless structured by  
long-term global currents: resource scarcity and 
climate change, in particular. The global context 
of booming consumption and scarcer resources 
will confer a broad long-term comparative 
advantage on resource efficient, innovative 
economies. Europe’s task is therefore to manage 
this long-term transition, while best protecting 
and innovating within a few highly sensitive 
industrial sectors.  
There are also important signs with the recent 
announcements in the United States and China 
that the issue of climate change is coming back 
onto the international stage. The recent 
commitment by all countries to negotiate a new 
global treaty on climate change by 2015 has given 
new impetus to international negotiations, 
although these are still proceeding slowly. 
Domestic climate policies are progressing, notably 
with President Obama’s recent announcement of 
domestic emissions regulations.  
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Shale gas has been a true revolution for the US 
energy markets. The development of shale gas 
goes back ten years and has taken place in the 
context of US laws on land ownership, 
according to which the owner of the surface 
also owns its underground (and reserves). This 
situation has provided a powerful incentive to 
explore shale gas and extract it as soon as the 
project is financially viable. 
It all began with a myriad of small independent 
producers, at a time when the United States was 
becoming increasingly dependent on natural gas 
imports via LNG terminals – seemingly 
indicating that natural gas would remain 
relatively expensive. Following years of 
development, the shale gas quantities entering 
the market are at a level that secures US self-
sufficiency in natural gas, have led to the 
cancelation of plans for LNG import terminals, 
considerations of the possibility to export shale 
gas as LNG, and very low natural gas prices. 
Indeed, prices have decreased to less than  
3 $/MMbtu (US dollars per million British 
Thermal Units), when Europe pays its gas 
around 10 $/MMbtu, and Japan, which is highly 
dependent on LNG imports, pays even more. 
As a result of the extremely low natural gas 
prices in the US, the natural gas industry was 
reorganised through mergers and acquisitions of 
the smaller, less profitable operators. The 
situation is now more stable with prices at 
around 5 $/MMbtu, still less than half the 
average European price and undoubtedly a 
positive factor for US industry competitiveness. 
It has led to the re-shoring of numerous energy-
intensive activities and to an imbalance with the 
European situation for global energy-intensive 
industries, such as the refinery industry which is 
a big energy user.  
A revolution in the EU? 
One may ask what positive impact the US gas 
shale revolution could have on the European 
industry. If the EU does not develop its own 
shale gas reserves, shale gas in the United States 
and other regions of the world could essentially 
depress the LNG prices. Yet, the LNG market 
is rather separate from the regional natural gas 
markets on which it only acts almost as a ceiling 
price. Accordingly, developments in this energy 
sector would have no direct impact on prices in 
the EU natural gas market, where they are 
below international LNG prices. 
If the EU was to develop its own shale gas 
reserves, the impact would of course be much 
greater. European shale gas would provide an 
additional natural gas source to the European 
regional gas market and would push down 
natural gas prices in European countries. It is, 
however, unlikely that it would take the same 
proportions as in the US since – as expert 
studies have shown – the development of shale 
gas in the EU could only compensate for the 
decrease of indigenous conventional natural gas 
production. We are unlikely to ever become  
self-sufficient in natural gas, as is the case for 
the United States. 
The cons – and solutions 
The opponents to shale gas point to the 
environmental problems associated with it and 
more particularly to the environmental risks of 
fracking (i.e., the production technique used to 
extract shale gas from the low permeability 
rocks). The technique involves the injection of 
large quantities of water with sand and additives 
in order to open cracks in the formation. The 
low permeability of shale also requires many 
drilling operations; even directional drilling 
requires several operations from the same point 
on the surface. The dangers and challenges 
therefore include: the amount of water needed; 
the possible risk of leakage of fracking water into 
the potable water table; the release of chemical 
additives; the number and extent of ground 
operations; the transport required, notably for 
the fracking water; and the associated noise. 
Another possible problem is the leakage of 
methane (shale gas itself) into the environment, 
which is a very powerful greenhouse gas with a 
3  Shale gas – A revolution?  
By Pierre Dechamps* 
* Pierre Dechamps is an Adviser in the Analysis Team of BEPA.  
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global warming potential more than twenty times 
that of carbon dioxide. Nonetheless, fracking is 
not a new technique: it is already used in Europe 
for the production of conventional 
hydrocarbons. Yet, the associated risks are 
multiplied by the number of operations required 
if shale gas is produced on a large scale. 
The logical response to potential challenges is 
to recognise that fracking and shale gas 
production are industrial activities of an 
engineering nature and that the associated risks 
must be understood and maintained at 
acceptable levels through regulation. The next 
question is whether or not the EU is already 
equipped with the necessary regulatory 
environment. A number of environmental 
directives apply (e.g. the water directive, the 
wastes directive, the REACH directive). 
Numerous regulations for the conventional 
hydrocarbon extraction industry also apply, but 
it could be that a set of additional rules must be 
agreed on to ensure that the societal cost of 
shale gas production is acceptable. The 
challenges associated to shale gas should be 
understood, controlled, and brought down to a 
level that is acceptable for society. It should be 
recognised, however, that these challenges will 
never be reduced to zero, just like we cannot 
design airplanes that will never crash. 
It is therefore important to provide shale gas 
production with the right regulatory 
environment in order to win public support. 
Unlike in the United States where the owner of 
the surface also owns its underground reserves, 
shale gas production in the EU will take place 
through concessions, given that property rights 
do not work in the same way in Europe. As the 
regulatory framework stands today in Europe, 
member state governments will be fracking in 
private citizens’ backyards. It is far more 
difficult with this ownership model to find 
incentives for local communities than it is with 
the US model. Admittedly, this situation is 
potentially problematic: public support has 
already been a major challenge for other energy 
and power generation technologies (e.g., the 
underground storage of CO2) and indeed 
applies to all energy infrastructures one can 
think of from windmills to nuclear power 
plants. 
The implications 
Shale gas can potentially have profound 
geopolitical consequences. It could, for 
instance, decrease US attention on the Middle 
East as a source of hydrocarbons. The EU 
would lose the indirect benefit of US actions 
and interventions in the region. Similarly, a 
possible shale gas revolution in Europe would 
affect relations with our current natural gas 
providers in the neighbouring countries. It 
would give more freedom and independence to 
transit countries from Russia, arguably why 
great hopes are put on shale gas in Poland. 
Ukraine could also develop its apparently large 
shale gas reserves for the same reasons. 
Another important aspect of shale gas is the 
influence it can have on our climate policies. 
While shale gas is increasingly used for power 
generation in the US, cheap coal is imported to 
some EU countries from the United States 
provoking a rise in greenhouse gas emissions of 
this energy sector in certain member states. In 
the longer term, if the EU developed its shale 
gas reserves, additional natural gas would 
replace coal in our generation mix. This would 
only have benefits for the environment and the 
climate. Sceptics would argue that shale gas runs 
the risk of delaying the development of 
renewables and capturing some of the research 
funds that would otherwise go into this sector. 
From a more general energy policy perspective, 
shale gas is currently one of the factors pushing 
the development of energy policies at national 
level rather than towards a true European 
policy. EU member states – even regions in 
some cases – have very different attitudes 
towards shale gas, from moratoria on 
exploration to great hopes. This results in a 
patchwork of conditions for growth of the 
industry rather than a coherent European 
approach. A more coordinated approach is 
required: this is true for shale gas, just like it is 
also true for responses to the failure of the 
emissions trading scheme and for the new 
market mechanisms emerging in the electricity 
sector. The danger of such reforms not taking 
place is that we end up remembering our era as 
one of the re-nationalisation of energy policies. 
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Where Do We Stand and What to Expect? – 
An analysis of the “state of the crisis”  
It was the ECB and its decision to be the lender 
of last resort that calmed down the immediate 
crisis and with it the fear of a eurozone meltdown. 
Today the focus has shifted: out of an economic 
crisis has developed a socio-economic crisis. 
Citizens and particularly the youth are hard-hit by 
unemployment and have become frustrated with 
elites, thus increasingly turning to populist 
movements. In this socio-economic dimension of 
the crisis, the ECB will not be able to assist. This 
time it is up to politicians to tackle problems 
decisively and swiftly. Although the author 
believes that small steps in restructuring the 
incomplete EMU will take place, he does not 
expect a major breakthrough until after German 
elections in September 2013.  
http://crisisobs.gr/en/2013/05/where-do-we-stand-
and-what-to-expect-an-analysis-of-the-state-of-the-crisis/ 
Crises in the Euro Area and Challenges for 
the European Union’s Democratic 
Legitimacy 
The economic crisis has caused a major 
disconnection between decision-making on the 
economy and public opinion. Democratic 
legitimisation of European economic governance 
is under scrutiny: first, output-based legitimacy is 
hard to obtain as the very nature of the eurozone 
limits economic policy choices of member states; 
second, input-based legitimacy is equally flawed. 
Crisis management was conducted through 
emergency summits that disregarded Parliaments, 
thus denying citizens the right to participate in 
developments. This has led to citizens both in 
donor and debtor countries to oppose bail-in 
plans. The authors suggest initiating a meaningful 
debate on economic choices with civil society. 
They also argue that any move towards a political 
union must be underpinned by the revitalisation 
of democratic control, including representational 
and participative elements. 
http://www.gmfus.org/archives/crises-in-the-euro-area-
and-challenges-for-the-european-unions-democratic-
legitimacy/ 
Making Progress towards the Completion of 
the Single European Labour Market 
To recover from the economic crisis it is crucial 
to use the full potential of the single market: the 
existing mobility for capital, goods and services 
must be extended to labour. To optimise the 
allocation of human resources, the authors 
suggest measures based on four main pillars: first, 
to improve implementation of existing tools (e.g. 
EURES); second, to invest in empowering 
individuals to move freely and minimise their 
vulnerability in the hosting country; third, to give 
the EU a stronger role in the process towards full 
labour mobility so that the EU can ensure a 
coherent approach towards equal treatment, 
minimum wages, working conditions and 
migration; and last, to monitor the intra EU 
movement more effectively to attain a sufficient 
level of knowledge about migration patterns.  
h t t p : / / w w w . e p c . e u / d o c u m e n t s / u p l o a d s /
pub_3529_single_european_labour_market.pdf  
Social Competition in the EU: Myths and 
realities 
High unemployment rates have given a new 
momentum to debates on competition among 
member states, and with it, to the “race to the 
bottom” in terms of social standards and ’social 
dumping’. The author examines this phenomenon 
and finds that, generally speaking, social 
competition between member states – particularly 
between ’old’ and ’new’ – is unlikely. This mainly 
results from the adjustment of labour costs. 
Looking at total productivity-adjusted labour 
costs, some ’new’ member states have actually 
become more expensive than ’old’ ones. In reality, 
the UK, Ireland and to some extent Luxembourg, 
out-perform all other countries in terms of labour 
costs. Also, labour standards – although mainly 
considered a national prerogative – have been 
harmonised at EU level. In that context, the study 
shows that labour standards are not consistently 
poor in new member states. 
h t t p ://www. en g . not re -europe . e u/m ed i a/
socialcompetition-maslauskaite-ne-jdi-june13.pdf  
4 Think Tank Twitter 
Think Tank Twitter (TTT) aims to provide regular information and updates on what is produced by think tanks and research centres across 
Europe (and beyond) on EU policy issues. As an analogy to the original Twitter, each summary – or tweet – does not exceed 140 words, rather 
than characters. Those who wish to signal new publications for possible inclusion can send them to the email address bepa-think-tank-
twitter@ec.europa.eu 
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The New Sick Man of Europe: The European 
Union 
This survey analyses public opinion in eight 
European countries: Britain, France, Germany, 
Italy, Spain, Greece, Poland and Czech Republic. 
The findings are rather worrisome: positive views 
of the EU are at or near their low point in most 
member states surveyed. EU favourability has 
decreased from a median of 60% in 2012 to 45% 
in 2013. The crisis has created centrifugal forces: 
southern European countries are becoming more 
and more frustrated with ruling elites in Brussels 
and Berlin, and the unfair economic system. 
Especially Germany continuously grows 
disconnected from France and the rest of Europe. 
Public opinion in France has changed significantly 
and now resembles much more that of southern 
European countries rather than that of Germany. 
Nonetheless, solid majorities in all member states 
surveyed favour keeping the euro.  
http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2013/05/Pew-
Research-Center-Global-Attitudes-Project-European-
Union-Report-FINAL-FOR-PRINT-May-13-
2013.pdf 
Towards a European Global Strategy. 
Securing European influence in a changing 
world 
The expected shift of power and transformation 
of the global system holds opportunities and 
challenges for the EU. To protect Europe’s well-
being, peace and shared values, the report 
identifies European interests and ways to protect 
them on three levels: at home, the EU should 
lower existing barriers between internal and 
external markets to foster trade and innovation. 
At a regional level, the neighbourhood should be 
perceived as a strategic opportunity and 
enlargement continued. At a global level, the EU 
should anticipate the need for governance and use 
both formal and informal avenues to reach goals. 
The EU should be proactive rather than reactive, 
while remaining pragmatic and able to adapt to 
circumstances. Development cooperation and 
trade will be particularly decisive instruments to 
fulfil strategic objectives. 
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/
connect/e59df3004fc9912d8289caccba746acc/
E G S _ R e p o r t . p d f ?
MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=e59df3004fc9912
d8289caccba746acc 
The Changing Face of North Africa. An 
opportunity for and with Europe 
The authors analyse today’s situation in Morocco, 
Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, two years after 
the Arab spring. To realign Europe’s role in the 
southern Mediterranean with its aim to promote 
democracy, employment and security, the authors 
argue for close cooperation: the EU should ease 
trade restrictions and encourage the five states to 
develop a common labour market. To ensure 
coherence, closer coordination between the EU 
Neighbourhood Policy and bilateral activities of 
member states (particularly France, Spain and 
Italy) is needed. To foster business start-up 
projects in North Africa, the EU should introduce 
a flexible visa policy for young entrepreneurs 
from the region. The success of the 
transformation will largely depend on the 
development of a pluralistic and free civil society 
which needs political and monetary support.  
http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/
xbcr/SID-77865594-982AE97C/bst_engl/
xcms_bst_dms_37944__2.pdf 
Copyright Reform for Growth and Jobs: 
Modernising the European copyright 
framework 
Today’s digital economy has developed much 
faster than EU copyright law. A copyright reform 
is needed to ensure fair and reliable returns to 
authors and right holders in Europe’s digital 
marketplace. The authors offer seven 
interdependent short-term recommendations for 
reform: update and amend the Information 
Society Directive; shorten terms of protection to 
proportionate levels; simplify online licensing 
across the EU; recalibrate the reproduction right; 
simplify legal protection of digital rights 
management systems; downsize the database 
right; and rebalance copyright enforcement 
remedies. These proposals aim at long-term 
harmonisation of copyright law that remains for 
now mainly a national process. The 
implementation of these proposals would have 
promising implications for the development of 
the digital economy and thus for growth and jobs.  
h t t p : / / g a l l e r y . m a i l c h i m p . c o m /
e 1 1 b 9 4 9 d 8 3 5 0 1 2 0 e 2 5 2 7 0 0 0 2 9 / f i l e s /
LisbonCouncil_policybrief_FIN2_web.pdf 
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Arrivals 
BEPA is delighted to welcome Maria Angeles 
Benitez Salas, its new Deputy Head as of 1st July. 
She has a long and outstanding record within the 
European Commission, most recently as Director in 
DG AGRI. 
Nuria Paredes joins the Outreach secretariat to 
replace Maria Alonso, who has moved to the EEAS. 
Activities 
On 7 June, BEPA organised a seminar on the 
attractiveness of Europe. The seminar constituted a 
debriefing of the “State of the European Union” 
conference, which took place the previous day and 
attracted hundreds of business leaders from over 
fifty multinational companies. Marc Vanheukelen, 
Head of Cabinet of Commissioner De Gucht, 
opened the seminar. INSEAD, Booz & Co and 
Ernst & Young presented their studies on European 
attractiveness. The discussion focused on ways to 
promote an environment where multinationals can 
maintain and increase their inward investment to 
generate growth and employment in Europe.  
On the same day and for the second year in a row, 
BEPA hosted a group of young francophone 
professionals selected by the Aspen Institute to visit 
the Commission. About twenty participants – 
including MEPs but also professionals less familiar 
with the Brussels milieu – discussed the workings of 
the European institutions. The visit also included an 
exchange of views with Commission representatives, 
including Commissioner for Internal Market and 
Services, Michel Barnier, and the Deputy Head of 
the Cabinet of President Barroso, Hugo Sobral.  
On 18-19 June, the European Group on Ethics in 
Science and New Technologies (EGE), the Irish 
National Advisory Committee on Bioethics, and the 
NEC-Forum of the 27 National Ethics Councils of 
the member states, met in different configurations in 
a series of events that took place in Dublin, under 
the auspices of the Irish EU Council Presidency. 
Within the context of Art 17 TEU and the 
European Year of Citizens, BEPA held a seminar 
with the Church and Society Commission of the 
Conference of European Churches (CEC), and the 
Commission of the Bishops’ Conferences of the 
European Community (COMECE) on June 20. 
During this event on “EU citizenship – challenges 
and benefits”, participants, experts and Commission 
officials discussed the concept of European 
citizenship and citizens’ understanding and 
awareness of it.  
On June 24, BEPA co-organised with the Austrian 
Institute for European Law and Policy a seminar on 
dialogue with civil society under Art. 11(2) TEU. 
Senior European officials, including BEPA’s Deputy 
Head Benitez Salas and DG Justice Director for 
Fundamental Rights and Union Citizenship Nemitz, 
debated with experts on the promises, reality and 
limitations of the “vertical civil dialogue”, as well as 
on the opportunities and challenges for EU 
legitimacy. The debate constitutes the beginning of a 
useful dialogue among Commission services on 
lessons identified and best practices when engaging 
with civil society. 
Forthcoming events 
The 3rd Meeting of the Science and Technology 
Advisory Council of the President (STAC) will take 
place on 9 July. The paper titled “Unleashing 
responsible innovation, the new science and society 
contract for sustainable and socially inclusive 
innovation in the EU”, requested by President 
Barroso, will be discussed with the President and 
then will be adopted.  
On same day, BEPA is organising a high-level 
seminar on “Public Sector Innovation”. President 
Barroso will open the seminar and the 
Commission’s new “Public Innovation Scoreboard” 
will be presented. Specialists and practitioners will 
share their insights and experience on public sector 
innovation and discuss the opportunities for and 
challenges to further progress at European and 
member state levels. 
In the context of the pilot project “New Narrative 
for Europe”, President Barroso and Polish Prime 
Minister Tusk will participate on July 11in the 
“General Assembly of Culture and Thinking on 
Europe”, that will take place in Warsaw. 
Intellectuals, artists, scientists and civil society will 
discuss the shared values needed to make a common 
story; Europe’s soft powers (the arts, heritage and 
sciences); and the image and role of Europe in a 
global and interdependent world.  
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